Rats were used as subjects in four experiments to investigate the transfer of learning from one context to another. Subjects received two sessions of training each day, one in each of two different contexts. Experiment 1 showed that the habituation of the unconditioned response to a stimulus presented in one context was left intact when the stimulus was presented in another context, but that latent inhibition was attenuated when preexposure and conditioning phases occurred in different contexts. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that a conditioned response made on the basis of an appetitive reinforcer was diminished when conditioning and testing occurred in different contexts, but that aversive conditioning was not influenced by the context in which testing occurred. In Experiment 4, the presence of an aversive reinforcer during training did not preclude the occurrence of context-specific conditioning on the basis of an appetitive reinforcer. Associative and retrieval-based interpretations of the results are explored.
These experiments investigated the extent to which the effects of training given in one context will transfer to a different context. The training procedures studied were classical conditioning and nonreinforced exposure to a stimulus. After classical conditioning we assessed the ability of a conditioned stimulus (CS) to evoke its conditioned response (CR) when presented in a context other than that used for training. After nonreinforced exposure we assessed both whether the habituated unconditioned response (UR) would return when the context was changed and whether the retardation of conditioning produced by nonreinforced exposure to the tobe-conditioned stimulus (the latent inhibition effect) would be evident when conditioning occurred in a new context. The pattern of context specificity shown by the phenomena of habituation, latent inhibition, and conditioning allows the assessment of an associative account of contextual effects and of alternative accounts that suppose the context to have its effect in other ways. Associative accounts (e.g., Wagner, 1976 Wagner, , 1978 Wagner, , 1981 emphasize the role played by direct associations between contextual cues and events that occur in their presence. Those who hold an alternative view do not usually deny that direct associations can be formed (e.g., Rescorla, Durlach, & Grau, 1985) but they assert that the context can also have other, more important functions. This alternative view has been presented in many different formulations (e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1985; Medin, 1976; Miller & Schachtman, 1985; Spear, 1973) , but its essence is the suggestion that the context helps in the retrieval of information about the relationship between the cues that have occurred in it (see Bouton & Swarztentruber, 1986) .
The effects of a context change on latent inhibition are well established and can be accommodated by both the associative The research reported here was supported by a grant from the United Kingdom Science and Engineering Research Council.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Geoffrey Hall, University of York, Heslington, York, YO1 5DD, United Kingdom. and the retrieval theories. Experiments, using a range of training procedures (appetitive conditioning, Channell & Hall, 1983; Hall & Channell, 1985 ; flavor-aversion learning, Hall & Channell, 1986 ; fear conditioning, Hall & Minor, 1984; Lovibond, Preston, & Mackintosh, 1984) , have routinely found that the retardation of conditioning produced by prior exposure to the to-be-conditioned stimulus is attenuated or even abolished when conditioning takes place in a context other than that used for preexposure. The retrieval interpretation of latent inhibition (e.g., Kasprow, Catterson, Schachtman, & Miller, 1984) argues that there is interference between information acquired during preexposure (for instance, some version of the information that the stimulus is not followed by any event of consequence) and the new learning that must go on during conditioning. To the extent that retrieval of information about the preexposure phase depends on the context, the latent inhibition effect will show context specificity. Wagner's (1981) theory supplies an associative account of the context specificity of latent inhibition by assuming that preexposure to the target stimulus allows the formation of a context-stimulus association. Contextual cues thereby become able to evoke a secondary state of activation (A2) in the "node" corresponding to the stimulus. Presentation of the stimulus itself will normally produce the primary state of activation (Al) but will be ineffective in doing so when the node is already in A2. The Al state is necessary for a stimulus to receive a full measure of processing, and, accordingly, associative learning will occur only poorly when training is given in a context with which the to-be-conditioned stimulus has become associated. A change in context, however, should allow the CS to evoke Al, and the latent inhibition effect should be attenuated. Wagner's (1976 Wagner's ( , 1981 theory also supplies an account of habituation. To be fully effective in evoking its UR, a stimulus must evoke the Al state; habituation occurs because the formation of a context-stimulus association reduces the capability of the stimulus to evoke Al. Thus (unlike retrieval theory, which does not attempt to supply any account of habituation), Wagner's theory predicts that habituation, like latent inhibition, should be context specific. The evidence on this issue has been mixed and difficult to interpret. Several experimenters (e.g., Baker & Mercier, 1982; Churchill, Remington, & Siddle, 1987; Leaton, 1974; Marlin & Miller, 1981) have found habituation to transfer across contexts, but these null results may just reflect the fact that the contexts used were not readily discriminated by the subjects. Others have found contextual change to restore a habituated response (e.g., Evans & Hammond, 1983; Shalter, 1975) , but these results might be the outcome of nonassociative processes; in particular, dishabituation might occur simply because of generalization decrement-because the change in context changes the way the target is perceived. The study by Hall and Channell (1985) avoided some of these difficulties of interpretation. In that study, after the subjects were exposed to a localized light in one context (A), the UR (orienting to the light) remained habituated when the stimulus was presented in a different but familiar context (B). In a further stage of training, the light was presented in both A and B and was followed by food. Appetitive conditioning proceeded more rapidly in B than in A, confirming both that latent inhibition tends to be context specific and also that the subjects (rats) could discriminate between the two contexts. Hall and Channell (1985; 'see also Hall & Schachtman, 1987) concluded that, unlike latent inhibition, and contrary to Wagner's theory, habituation is not context specific. One aim of our first experiment was to replicate and extend this theoretically important dissociation of habituation and latent inhibition.
The associative and retrieval theories make different predictions about the effects on performance of a change in context following reinforced training. According to Wagner (1981) , a change of context should, other things being equal, allow a CS to evoke a more vigorous CR. In the context used for training, contextual cues will tend to establish an A2 representation of the CS, thereby limiting the capability of the CS to generate Al. In a different context, presentation of the CS will evoke Al. Since Al is better than A2 at activating an associative link, performance will be superior when the context is changed. Retrieval theory appears to lead to a quite different prediction (but see, e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1985; Bouton, 1988 , for attempts to devise a version of the theory that avoids making this different prediction). A change of context should reduce the subject's ability to retrieve the information (e.g., the CS-US link) acquired during training, and the likelihood or vigor of the CR will be reduced. As Bouton (1988) pointed out, the assumption that conditioned responding does in fact show context specificity is widely held but is not well supported by the empirical evidence. The number of experiments in which a change of context has produced a loss of conditioned responding (e.g., Archer, Sjoden, Nilsson, & Carter, 1979; Balaz, Capra, Haiti, & Miller, 1981; Balaz, Capra, Kasprow, & Miller, 1982; Lovibond et al., 1984, Experiment IB) is matched by an equal number that failed to find any effect of the change (e.g., Bouton & King, 1983; Kaye, Preston, Szabo, Druiff, & Mackintosh, 1987; Lovibond et al., 1984, Experiments 1C and 2) .
Although none of the studies mentioned above finds the enhancement of performance predicted by Wagner's theory, it would be unwise to take them as support for the retrieval theory. A failure to find an effect of context change may again (as in the case of habituation) mean only that the contexts were not well discriminated or that an insensitive measure of conditioning was used. And, as Lovibond et al. (1984) discussed, there are several mechanisms in addition to retrieval failure that might be responsible for the loss of conditioned responding when it occurs. These other mechanisms include generalization decrement (the CS may be perceived differently in a new context), configural learning (the initial CR may be governed by a CS that is a configuration of the experimenter's stimulus and the contextual cues), and associative effects (the CR in the training context may depend, in part, on associations between the context and the reinforcer that will be absent if transfer is tested in a context in which the reinforcer has not previously been presented). Experiments 2, 3, and 4 attempted to assess whether conditioning is context specific, using a training preparation designed to control for the confounding factors just mentioned. The training procedures used in these experiments were, as far as possible, identical to those used in our investigation of the context specificity of habituation and latent inhibition that constituted Experiment 1.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, subjects in the critical experimental condition received exposure to a discrete cue in a given context. They then received tests for habituation and latent inhibition, in which the same cue was presented in a different context. Control subjects received the test trials in the context used for initial training. To equate the rat's experience of the training and test contexts, all subjects received training in which one stimulus (X) was presented in Context A and another cue (Y) was presented in a different context, B. An indirect measure of habituation was used, in which the tendency of the stimulus to disrupt responding on an appetitively rewarded baseline was monitored. Following habituation training, the rats received two further stages of training. The first of these tested whether the habituated UR was restored by a change in context; the second assessed the extent to which the retardation of further learning was influenced by this context change. Thus, half the subjects (Group D for "different") received presentations of Stimulus Y in Context A and stimulus X in Context B; for Group S ("same") these stimuli were presented in the same contexts as those in which they occurred during habituation training. Subsequently, the stimuli were followed by the delivery of footshock, and the acquisition of conditioned suppression was monitored. If these stimuli and contexts influence habituation and latent inhibition in the same way as those employed by Hall and Channell (1985) , then, during the first test, unconditioned suppression should not be restored in Group D (i.e., habituation should transfer across contexts), but the acquisition of conditioned suppression should proceed more rapidly in Group D than in Group S (i.e., latent inhibition should show context specificity).
Method Subjects
The subjects were 16 naive, male hooded (Lister) rats with a mean ad lib weight of 342 g (range: 315-365 g). The rats were maintained at 80% of their ad lib weights throughout the experiment by being given a restricted amount of food each day.
Apparatus
Two pairs of identical standard Skinner boxes (supplied by Campden Instruments Ltd.) were used. Each box had three walls of sheet aluminum, a transparent plastic door as the fourth wall, a grid floor, and a white translucent plastic ceiling. One of the walls adjacent to the door contained a recessed food tray guarded by a transparent plastic flap, 6 cm high x 5 cm wide, that was hinged to the top of the opening to the food tray. Pushing this flap inward from its vertical resting position allowed subjects to gain access to the food tray. An inward movement of the flap actuated a microswitch, and each closing of the switch was recorded as a single response. The flap automatically returned to its resting position when the subject removed its snout from the food tray. Retractable levers fitted alongside the food tray remained retracted throughout the experiment. Each box was housed in a sound-and light-excluding shell and was brightly lit by a 30-W striplight (rated for 240 V but operated at 100 V) positioned above the ceiling. A speaker fitted to the rear wall of the box allowed the presentation of auditory stimuli. The grid floor of the chamber could be electrified by means of a Campden Instruments shock generator (Model 521C) and scrambler (Model 521s).
The two pairs of boxes differed in the following ways: One pair was housed in a large experimental room, and each box in this pair was perfumed by the addition of a small amount of eucalyptus oil to the tray below the grid floor. For the other pair, the odor was that of iso-amyl acetate. The latter pair of boxes were housed in a smaller room in a different part of the laboratory. They were also made visually distinctive by the addition of black and white checkered wallpaper to the wall that served as the door and the wall immediately opposite.
Two stimuli were used: The offset of the striplight for 30 s, and a 30-s presentation of a 20-Hz train of clicks at an intensity of 82 dB (A). We considered these two events likely to be readily discriminable. We also thought that their physical properties would be unlikely to change according to the physical context in which they were presented; a possible source of generalization decrement was therefore less likely to be present. All the boxes had the same size and shape and were equipped with identical speakers, so that the auditory cue would be the same in both contexts. We assumed that darkness would be the same in whichever context it was experienced.
Procedure
On each day of the experiment, the rats received two sessions of training, one in each context. The context they experienced in the morning will be referred to as Context A; that experienced in the afternoon (approximately 4 h after the morning session) will be referred to as Context B. Half of the animals in each group experienced a given pair of Skinner boxes as Context A, and half as Context B. All sessions were 40 min in duration unless specified otherwise.
Pretraining. The rats received two days of magazine training, in which 45-mg food pellets were delivered on a variable-time, 60-s schedule. On the first of these days, the plastic flap covering the entrance to the food tray was fixed in a raised position to facilitate retrieval of the food pellets. On the second day, the flap was returned to its vertical resting position, making it necessary for subjects to move the flap to gain access to the food tray when a food pellet had been delivered. On the next day, the rats were trained to press the flap to obtain food pellets on a continuous reinforcement schedule. After 75 reinforcers had been obtained, the rat was removed from the box. Finally, on 2 days, responding to the flap was reinforced according to a VI60 (variable-interval, 60-s) schedule. This schedule remained in force throughout the rest of the experiment.
Habituation training and testing. Over the next 8 days, all rats received habituation training. Each rat experienced both stimuli (the click and darkness), one in each context. For half of the rats in each group, the click was presented in Context A, and darkness was presented in Context B. For the remaining rats, this arrangement was reversed. The stimulus presented in Context A during habituation training will be referred to as X, and that presented in Context B as Y. There were three trials in each session, the interval between the onset of successive trials was 10.5 min, and the first trial occurred 10 min after the beginning of the session. The course of habituation was assessed using a suppression ratio of the form A /(A + B), where A represents the number of responses during the CS and B represents the number of responses that were performed during the 30-s period immediately prior to stimulus onset. Individual suppression ratios were calculated for each trial; the numbers of responses during the prestimulus and CS periods were pooled across stimulus X and Y.
On the next day, the context specificity of habituation was assessed. Group S received another day's training using just the same procedures as had been used over the previous 8 days. For Group D, however, Stimulus Y was now presented in Context A, and Stimulus X was presented in Context B.
The next two days allowed assessment of the context specificity of latent inhibition. The stimuli were presented as they had been on the habituation test day, but were followed by a .25-mA footshock of .5 s duration. The development of conditioned suppression was also measured using the suppression ratio A/(A + B).
Results and Discussion
The performance shown by subjects in the two groups showed no systematic differences on the basis of the particular stimuli assigned as X and Y, and no differences dependent on the context designated as A and B. Therefore, the data were pooled across stimulus type and context type. The lefthand side of Figure 1 shows the mean unconditioned suppression elicited by the stimuli (pooled across both stimuli, X and Y, for each group) on each trial of the first and last days of habituation training. It is clear that stimulus presentation initially (Trial 1 of Day 1) disrupted appetitive responding, but that by the final day of stimulus exposure (Day 8), stimulus presentation no longer disrupted responding. Statistical analysis confirmed these impressions. The mean rates of response during the prestimulus periods for the days presented in Figure 1 (Days 1 and 8) were 28.69 responses per min for Group S and 37.43 for Group D. These rates did not differ significantly, F(\, 14) = 3.63, p > .05. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on the suppression scores for the six habituation training trials depicted in Figure 1 revealed no effect of group (F < 1), an effect of trial, F(5, 70) = 9.77, p < .01, and no interaction between these two variables, (F< 1).
It is apparent from Figure 1 that unconditioned suppression was not restored on the test session for Group D when the stimuli were presented in a different context. The mean rate 10. An ANOVA conducted on the suppression ratios for these trials revealed no effect of group or trial, and no interaction between these variables, largest F(2, 28) = 1.31, p > .25. The right side of Figure 1 depicts the acquisition of conditioned suppression in Groups S and D. It is apparent that acquisition was more rapid in Group D than in Group S. Statistical analysis confirmed this description of the results. An ANOVA conducted on the suppression scores revealed no main effect of group, F(l, 14) = 2.76, p > .10, but there was an effect of trial, F(5, 70) = 13.13, p< .01, and an interaction between these two variables, F(5, 70) = 2.63, p < .05. The suppression scores were derived from equivalent baseline response rates. The mean rates of response during conditioning in the pretrial periods, 31.17 responses per min for Group S and 39.27 for Group D, did not differ significantly, F(l,l4) = 2.02,p>.15.
The results of Experiment 1 replicate the central finding of Hall and Channell (1985) in showing that habituation is not context specific but that the retardation of learning produced by nonreinforced stimulus preexposure is reduced by a change of context. The fact that unconditioned suppression did not return following a change in context is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that Wagner's (1981) theory of habituation (specifically the role assigned to context-target associations) may need to be modified, because this theory predicts that habituation (like latent inhibition) will be context specific. Second, it indicates that when, for example, Stimulus X was presented in Context B (for Group D), the subject's perception of the stimulus was not affected. If the stimulus had undergone generalization decrement (Hull, 1943) as a result of the change in context, it should once again have elicited unconditioned suppression. A similar argument applies to the suggestion that the effective stimulus in the first stage of training might have been some configuration of the discrete cue and the context. It does not appear, therefore, that the stimuli and contexts used in this experiment interact in such a way as to produce changes in the physical properties of the stimuli or to influence the subjects' perception of them. It follows that the attenuation of latent inhibition in Group D is unlikely to be a consequence of the subjects' failing to identify the conditioned stimuli as being the same stimuli to which they had been preexposed.
Experiment 2
Although the results of Experiment 1 argue against the associative account of contextual effects offered by Wagner (1976 Wagner ( , 1981 , nothing in them requires us to accept the alternative, retrieval, account. A demonstration that the likelihood of conditioned responding is diminished by a change of context, however, would constitute positive evidence in favor of the retrieval function of contextual cues. This issue was examined in Experiment 2.
The design and procedure of the initial training phase of this experiment were closely similar to those employed in Experiment 1, the chief exception being that the subjects received reinforced rather than nonreinforced training. An appetitive Pavlovian conditioning procedure was used, in which each presentation of a stimulus was followed by the delivery of a food pellet. Thus, Stimulus X was trained as a CS in Context A, and Y as a CS in Context B. The measure of conditioning used was the development of a tendency to approach the site of food delivery during the CS. In the test phase, Group D received Stimulus X in Context B and Stimulus Y in Context A. For Group S, the relationship between stimuli and contexts remained unchanged. If Context A increases the ability of the subjects to retrieve the X-food association, and Context B the ability to retrieve the Y-food association, then Group S might be expected to show more responding at test than Group D (for which this contextual aid to retrieval would not be available). But if Wagner's (1981) account is correct, performance might actually be improved when the contextual cues do not activate a representation of the CS. Conditioned responding should therefore appear with increased vigor in Group D.
Method
The subjects were 16 naive, male hooded (Lister) rats with a mean ad lib weight of 331 g (range: 300-375 g). The animals were maintained in the same way as in Experiment 1, and the apparatus was also the same as Experiment 1.
The general procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1: The rats received two sessions each day, one in Context A, the other in Context B. Two days of initial training were given, in which the rats were trained to retrieve food pellets from a food tray. They did not, however, receive any instrumental training in pushing the food tray flap; rather, classical conditioning began immediately.
There were 8 days of conditioning, in which presentations of Stimulus X and Stimulus Y (in Contexts A and B, respectively) were followed by the delivery of a single food pellet. There were six trials in each session, and X and Y were each 10 s in duration. The first trial occurred 5.5 min after the beginning of the session, and the intertrial interval (ITI) was approximately 5.7 min.
On the following 2 days, the rats received test sessions in which X and Y were presented in extinction. For Group S, these presentations occurred in the same contexts as during conditioning, but for Group D, Stimuli X and Y were presented in Contexts B and A, respectively. The number of trials and the ITI were the same as during conditioning. All other details of the experiment were identical to those described for Experiment 1.
The response measure was that of pushing aside the hinged flap in front of the food tray, a pattern of responding that has been found to develop as a CR, given stimulus-food pairings (Channell & Hall, 1983) . The score used was an elevation ratio that took the following form: the response rate in the presence of Stimulus X and Stimulus Y divided by the rate exhibited in the absence of these stimuli during the two daily sessions.
Results
On the first day of conditioning the rats responded very little during stimulus presentations, but by the final day of training they responded at a far higher rate during the stimuli than in the intertrial periods.
The left-hand side of Figure 2 shows the mean elevation ratio for the final two days of conditioning (pooled across Stimulus X and Stimulus Y). It is clear that elevation during the stimuli was marked and approximately equivalent in Group S and Group D (which had not been treated differently up to this stage). An ANOVA conducted on the elevation scores revealed no difference between the groups (F < 1). These ratio scores were derived from closely similar baseline rates of response. The mean rates of response during the ITI, 1.28 responses per min (rpm) for Group S and 1.32 rpm for Group D, did not differ (F< 1).
The right side of Figure 2 depicts performance during the two test sessions, again pooled across both stimuli. It is clear that the mean elevation ratio for Group S was higher than that for Group D. An ANOVA conducted on the elevation ratios revealed that the groups differed in these scores, F(l, 14) = 4.85, p < .05. Again, the mean rates of response during the ITI, .45 rpm for Group S and .59 rpm for Group D, did not differ, F(l, 14) =1.01, p> .3.
Discussion
The results of this experiment do not support the prediction, derived from Wagner's (1981) theory, that conditioned responding will be enhanced when the CS is presented in a different context. Rather, the magnitude of the CR was diminished, a result consistent with the suggestion that contextual cues may serve to facilitate the retrieval of information about the CS. Other, theoretically less interesting, explanations for context specificity in conditioned responding are difficult to apply to this result. The procedure of giving conditioning in both contexts ensured that the test and the training contexts were equated in associative strength. The contexts and the stimuli used were the same as employed in Experiment 1. The habituation results of that experiment indicated that the subjects were able to identify the target stimulus presented in the test as being the same as that experienced in a different training context. It is difficult, therefore, to argue that the loss of conditioned responding seen in the present experiment is a consequence of some change in the perceived nature of the CS produced by the contextual change. This experiment, therefore, appears immune to the criticisms leveled by Lovibond et-al. (1984) at earlier attempts to demonstrate context specificity in conditioning. It is, so far as we are aware (but see Hall & Channell, 1985) , the first experimental demonstration of context specificity in conditioning that controls for the various confounding variables tested by Lovibond et al. (1984) .
Experiment 3
If one accepts Experiment 2 as supporting a retrieval account of contextual effects in conditioning, it becomes necessary to explain why other experimenters (e.g., Bouton & King, 1983; Lovibond et al., 1984) have failed to find any decrement in conditioned responding when a CS is presented in a different context from that in which conditioning originally occurred. In particular, Lovibond et al. (1984) , in their Experiments 1C and 2, used an experimental design closely similar to that used in our Experiment 2, but failed to find any evidence of context specificity. The only obvious procedural difference was that they used an aversive rather than an appetitive procedure. It may be that our contexts (or stimuli) were more discriminable than those used by Lovibond et al. and that this allowed context-specific conditioning to be observed; alternatively, the difference in outcome may have reflected the difference in the nature of the reinforcer employed. Experiment 3 attempted to investigate which of these factors is critical in determining whether context specific conditioning is observed.
Experiment 3 employed the same general procedures as were used in Experiment 2, except that during conditioning the stimuli were followed by the delivery of an electric shock. Conditioning was measured by the tendency of the rats to suppress appetitively rewarded flap-entry responses in the presence of the stimuli, X and Y. Subsequently, the rats were again tested in extinction, with the stimuli being presented either in the same context as during conditioning (for Group S) or in a different context (for Group D). If the difference between the results of Experiment 2 and those of Lovibond et al. (1984) depends on the particular contexts and stimuli used, then conditioned suppression should be less evident during the test in Group D than in Group S. If, however, the nature of the reinforcer is critical, then we might expect to replicate the result of Lovibond et al. (1984) , with Group S and Group D showing similar levels of conditioned suppression.
Method
The subjects were 16 male hooded (Lister) rats with a mean ad lib weight of 334 g (range: 325-345 g). The rats were maintained in the same way as Experiment 1, and the apparatus was that used in Experiment 1.
The rats were once again given two sessions each day, one in Context A, the other in B. Initially, the rats were trained to press the flap in front of the food tray in order to obtain food in the same way as Experiment 1 and, as in that experiment, a baseline of responding was established, supported by a VI60 schedule. Eight days of aversive conditioning followed, in which the stimuli, X and Y, were presented just as in Experiment 1, except that each stimulus presentation was followed by the delivery of electric shock. The duration of the shocks was .5 s, and their magnitude was .1 mA on Days 1 and 2, .15 mA on Days 3 and 4, and .2 mA on the remaining 4 days of conditioning.
On the next day (Day 9), all subjects received test sessions in which X and Y were presented in extinction. For Group S, the procedure was identical to that employed on the test day of conditioning, except that the stimuli were not followed by shocks. For Group D, Stimulus Y was presented in Context A, and Stimulus X was presented in Context B. Conditioning was assessed using a suppression ratio. Details of this experiment that have not been specified were identical to those described for Experiment 1. conditioning, and separately for the three nonreinforced test trials. The terminal level of conditioned responding was similar in the two groups that had received identical treatment up to this point. More critically, the two groups did not differ in the suppression they showed over the test, either on the first test trial or as suppression was extinguished over the later trials.
Statistical analysis confirmed this description of the results. An ANOVA conducted on the suppression scores for the final day of conditioning revealed no difference between the two groups (F < I). The two groups had comparable baseline response rates. An analysis of the response rates recorded during the prestimulus periods on the last conditioning day showed that Group S, with a mean of 38.12 responses per minute, and Group D, with a mean of 43.37 responses per minute did not differ (F < 1). The response rate during the prestimulus periods of the test session were 34.00 responses per min for Group S and 40.83 for Group D; an analysis of these response rates showed that they did not differ, F(l, 14) = 2.31, p > .15. An ANOVA conducted on the test trial suppression ratios, with group and trial as variables, revealed no effect of group (F< 1), an effect of trial, F(2, 28) = 38.04, p < .01, and no interaction between these variables (F< 1). Figure 3 shows the mean suppression ratios for Group S and Group D, pooled over all three trials for the final day of
Results

Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 stand in marked contrast to those of Experiment 2. Experiment 2 showed that conditioned responding on the basis of an appetitive reinforcer was diminished when it was assessed in a test context that differed from the training context. In Experiment 3, which differed chiefly in that an aversive reinforcer was used, conditioned responding transferred perfectly to a new context. The absence of context specificity in Experiment 3 suggests that the contexts and stimuli used in this series of experiments do not differ in any fundamental way from those used by Lovibond et al. (1984) ; Lovibond et al. also failed to find an effect of a change in context using the conditioned suppression procedure when the associative histories of the contexts were equated. The absence of context specificity in Experiment 3 also gives further grounds for thinking that the context specificity of appetitive conditioning that was observed in Experiment 2 was not a result of generalization decrement. Had it been so, the processes responsible for the effect in that experiment would presumably have made themselves evident in Experiment 3, too. To that extent, results of Experiment 3 strengthened our claim to have demonstrated a retrieval-based context specificity of appetitive conditioning. It remained puzzling, however, why no effect was evident in the aversive case. Our next experiment was designed to replicate and extend the effect found with appetitive conditioning in Experiment 2 and also to investigate one possible reason why no effect was found in the aversive case.
Experiment 4
Experiments 2 and 3 differed not only in the nature of the US, but also in the number, spacing, and duration of the trials during training. There is no reason to suppose that any of these procedural details might be responsible for the difference in outcome. Nonetheless, it seemed worthwhile to attempt to increase the generality of the effect found in Experiment 2 by training S and D groups with a trial arrangement identical to that used in Experiment 3 except for the use of an appetitive reinforcer.
In addition, we included a further pair of groups (designated Group S+ and Group D+) that were treated in just the same way as Groups S and D, except that unsignalled electric shocks were presented during the ITI's in training. These shocks were identical in duration, number, and intensity to those presented (as USs) in Experiment 3. These groups allowed us to assess the possibility that conditioning failed to show context specificity in Experiment 3 because the rats failed to discriminate between the two contexts. Clearly our two contexts are (normally) quite discriminable: The results of Experiment 2 and of the latent inhibition test of Experiment 1 are evidence of this. But we can allow the possibility (discussed by Kaye et al., 1987 , with reference to their experiments) that procedures of the type used in Experiment 3 might act to reduce the discriminability of the contexts. With our experimental design, the subjects receive initial conditioning in both contexts. This is necessary to ensure that the two contexts are matched in associative strength. But it also means that the subjects receive experience of what might be assumed to be a very salient event (electric shock) in both. The addition of a very salient common element to the two contexts may increase their similarity and the likelihood that generalization will occur between them. If this argument is correct, the addition of the shocks during training for Groups S+ and D+ should eliminate the rat's ability to discriminate between the contexts, and thus eliminate the context specificity (of the appetitive CR) that the rats would otherwise show.
Method
The subjects were 32 naive, male hooded (Lister) rats with a mean ad lib weight of 378 g (range: 255-445 g). The rats were maintained in the same way as in Experiment 1, and the apparatus was that employed in Experiment 1.
The procedure closely paralleled that used in Experiments 2 and 3. All the rats again received two sessions each day, and were initially trained to retrieve food pellets from a food tray. Eight days of training were then given, in which Stimulus X and Stimulus Y (in Contexts A and B, respectively) were followed by the delivery of a food pellet. The stimuli were 30 s in duration and were presented in the same temporal arrangement as was used in Experiments 1 and 3; that is, there were three trials per session, the first occurring 10 min after the beginning of the session, and subsequent trials being presented with an ITI of 10.5 min. For Group S+ and Group D+, three electric shocks were also presented during the 40-min session. One was presented 5 min after the start of the session, and the remaining two occurred at 10-min intervals. This arrangement ensured that the shocks did not occur in close temporal proximity to the appetitive conditioning trials. The magnitude and duration of the shocks were the same as in Experiment 3; that is, they were .5 s in duration and were gradually increased in magnitude, from . 1 mA to .2 mA across the eight training sessions. As in Experiment 2, the development of conditioned responding was monitored by computing an elevation ratio.
On Day 9, Group D and Group D+ received Stimulus Y in Context A and Stimulus X in Context B, whereas Group S and Group S+ continued with the arrangement experienced on the last day of conditioning. No reinforcers were delivered during these test sessions.
Results
The left side of Figure 4 shows the group mean elevation ratios derived from the pooled scores for all trials over the final 2 days of conditioning. There was no systematic difference between the groups assigned to the S condition and the groups assigned to the D condition, nor between groups that had received shocks during training and those that had not. Nor did the groups differ much in their baseline response rates. The mean rate of response shown during the ITIs was 1.14 rpm in Group S, 1.65 rpm in Group D, 1.62 rpm in Group S+, and 1.58 rpm in Group D+. A factorial analysis of variance conducted on these rates with context (S or D in the test) and shock (presence or absence in conditioning) as factors revealed no significant main effects and no interaction between the factors (Fs < 1). A similar analysis of the elevation ratios again revealed no significant differences (all Fs < 1).
The right side of Figure 4 depicts the mean elevation ratios during the test session shown by the groups. Again, the responses of all subjects in all test trials were pooled before the ratio was computed. It is clear that Group D and Group D+ performed in a similar fashion and that both showed smaller elevation scores during the test than Groups S and S+, which themselves differed little from one another. These A similar factorial analysis of the elevation scores revealed no effect of shock (F < 1), but a significant effect of context, F(l, 28) = 7.48, p < .05. There was no significant interaction between these factors (F< 1).
Discussion
Experiment 4 confirms the finding of Experiment 2 that an appetitive CR will fail to transfer fully from one context to another. This context specificity was found to be independent of whether or not noncontingent electric shocks were presented in the contexts during training. We must conclude that the presence of shocks does not make the contexts difficult to discriminate. There is, thus, no support for the hypothesis that aversive conditioning fails to show context specificity (Experiment 3) because of shock-induced reduction in the discriminability of the contexts.
We can only speculate as to why conditioned suppression showed no context specificity in Experiment 3 (see also Lovibond et al., 1984) . One possibility is that aversive conditioning procedures, rather than reducing the discriminability of the contexts, reduced the discriminability of the CSs (Stimuli X and Y). The occurrence of a salient event like a shock immediately after the presentation of a CS might disrupt the processes responsible for encoding that stimulus (or, at least, might do so more effectively than the occurrence of a food US). Certainly, Hearst (1962) provided some evidence to suggest that conditioned responding governed by an aversive reinforcer tends to generalize more widely than does responding established using an appetitive reinforcer. If, in the limiting case, the use of a shock US prevented the animal from encoding the distinctive features of the CSs, X and Y, there would be complete generalization between them, and context specificity could not be observed. Without empirical evidence it would be fruitless to pursue this speculation. We shall return instead to the positive conclusion that emerges from this experiment-that although aversive training procedures may fail to reveal the effect, the appetitive training procedures used in Experiment 4 and in Experiment 2 provide clear evidence of the context specificity of conditioning.
General Discussion
These experiments confirm (see Hall & Channell, 1985) that latent inhibition shows context specificity and that habituation does not. They demonstrate, further, that (appetitive) conditioning also shows context specificity. We have presented reasons for concluding that these cases of context specificity are not to be explained in terms of generalization decrement or in terms of the notion that the target stimulus might form a configuration with the context. This pattern of results presents a number of difficulties for the suggestion that contextual effects might be explained solely in associative terms. Wagner's (1976 Wagner's ( , 1981 theory attributes both habituation and latent inhibition to the formation of context-stimulus associations, and, thus, is embarrassed by lack of context specificity of habituation. The demonstration of context-specific conditioning is equally problematic. Some instances of such context specificity might be explained in associative terms by arguing that context-US associations will be formed during conditioning, that these associations are partly responsible for evoking the CR, and that a different test context will lack such associations. But in our experiments, we took the precaution of using a test context that was just as likely to have associations with the US as the context that was used for initial training. The test context would not, of course, have any associations with the CS presented in it during the test phase, but we have argued that this should, according to Wagner's (1981) theory, tend to enhance rather than diminish the magnitude of the CR.
Before rejecting the associative explanation, we should consider another way in which it might be applied to the results presented here. Hall and Pearce (1979) have demonstrated that an effect akin to latent inhibition can occur during the course of conditioning itself-that a pretrained CS forms further associations only slowly. This effect, like latent inhibition itself, shows context specificity ) and can be explained in associative terms in just the same way-as a consequence of the context-CS association's reducing the degree to which the stimulus receives processing. In our tests for context specificity of conditioning, we presented the CSs in extinction, a procedure that permits further learning (that responsible for the loss of the CR) to occur. If a CR presented in a new context were processed more effectively than a CS presented in the original training context, then extinction of the CR would occur more readily in the new context. Differential rates of extinction could, therefore, be responsible for the context specificity demonstrated in Experiments 2 and 4.
In order to test this explanation, it is necessary to look at the performance to Stimulus X and Y shown on the very first occasion on which they were presented during the test sessions-that is, before the subjects had experienced nonreinforced presentations of each stimulus. The associative account predicts that there should be no contextual effect on this trial; however, the first test trials in Experiments 2 and 4 revealed the same pattern of results as was evident when performance was pooled over all of the test trials. That is, subjects in the "same" condition showed a larger CR than those in the "different" condition. Individual elevation scores were calculated by dividing the rate of response during Stimuli X and Y (pooled) on the first test trial by the background rate of responding recorded on the first test day. In Experiment 2, the background rates of 0.62 rpm for Group S and 0.87 for Group D did not differ significantly, F(\, 14) = 1.29, p > .25. There was, however, a large numerical difference between the elevation ratios shown on the first trial by the two groups. The mean elevation scores were 31.44 for Group S and 15.23 for Group D. Because of considerable within-group variability, to be expected given the small sample of behavior used here (stimulus duration was only 10 s), the difference between these scores fell short of statistical reliability, F(l, 14) = 2.46. In Experiment 4, however, the stimuli lasted 30 s, which allowed a more reliable measure of behavior. The mean firsttrial elevation scores (calculated using the background rates reported in the results section of Experiment 4) for the groups were 9.75 for Group S, 8.61 for Group S+, 5.88 for Group D, and 4.61 for Group D+. A factorial analysis of variance with context (S or D at test) and shock (presence or absence during conditioning) as factors showed that there was a significant effect of context, F(l, 28) = 5.11, p < .05, no effect of shock, and no interaction between these factors, (Fs < 1). The appearance of the effect of a change in context on the first test trial is inconsistent with the associative account, but it is perfectly compatible with the retrieval hypothesis.
The fact that the pattern of context specificity of appetitive conditioning reported here is entirely consistent with the retrieval hypothesis for contextual effects may in part reflect the fact that this theory is less precisely specified than the associative account. Moreover, the retrieval theory deals with a narrower range of phenomena (e.g., it does not deal with habituation), and thus is less vulnerable to disproof. Because it seems necessary for us to accept some version of the retrieval theory, we should attempt to specify it more precisely. One interesting possibility is to develop the parallel between the control governed by the context and the control shown by an occasion setter (Holland, 1983) . Holland (1983) has suggested that feature-positive training, in which X is followed by a reinforcer only when it is preceded by Stimulus A, will establish A as an occasion setter able to modulate the activity of the X-US association. Stimulus A will signal the relation that holds between X and the US or will allow retrieval about the relation. Bouton and Swartzentruber (1986) have argued that contextual cues having conditional control over Pavlovian associations function in just this way. However, there is an important difference between the contextual specificity shown in our experiments and that discussed by Bouton and Swartzentruber (1986) . Those authors gave their subjects explicit discrimination training, in which a CS was followed by a reinforcer in one context, but was not reinforced when it was presented in another context. Their procedure therefore resembled experiments on occasion setting; such experiments typically also involve explicit training, in which the animals experience for instance, a mixture of A-X reinforced trials and nonreinforced X-alone trials. In our experiments, there was no explicit discrimination training-subjects simply experienced reinforced X trials (say) in Context A. It becomes necessary to suggest, therefore, that such training is enough in itself to endow A with occasionsetting properties.
The conditions necessary for a stimulus to be established as an occasion setter remain to be fully established. However, Rescorla (1988) has argued that the critical component of the training used to generate an occasion setter is that a stimulus that has undergone extinction is subsequently reinforced in the presence of the potential occasion setter. In our appetitive conditioning procedure, the first phase of magazine training in which food is frequently presented will presumably result in some aspect of the training situation becoming strongly associated with food. During conditioning, this association will undergo extinction during the ITIs when no food is presented. Thus, a cue that has been reinforced and then extinguished (an element of the context) will be present on the conditioning trials. This training, therefore, may be sufficient to establish contextual control of performance to the CS.
These comments on the conditions that might allow the context to develop an occasion-setting property are speculative. Nevertheless, the context-specific nature of conditioning demonstrated here constitutes an important addition to the growing body of converging evidence suggesting that stimuli can assume a superordinate role, modifying the operation of associative connections.
